U.S. choppers 'highly desirable' targets

Posted by Frank James at 2:04 pm CST

The recent attacks on U.S. helicopters in Iraq, have drawn the analysis of Anthony Cordesman, the highly respected national security analyst at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

His take: We should keep the downings in perspective; there’ve been relatively few considering the number of U.S. flights every day in Iraq.

“Six helicopter downings in three weeks does not make a pattern, or provide a clear demonstration of such changes in Sunni insurgent tactics and strategy, particularly since one may prove to be an accident. It is, however, a warning of the kind of adaptation the US may face over the coming months. The insurgents may have found a new, high profile way to attack the US at a time they are fighting a political and perceptual battle against the US.

This is true even though recent losses must be kept in perspective. The previous high for any single month is close to that for February 2006, and was five aircraft lost in January 2004. Over time, more than 170 American troops have died in helicopter crashes/attacks, roughly, or about 5.5 percent of American military casualties killed to date.

A Brookings estimate indicates that the US has lost less than 60 helicopters since the start of the war in 2003, and flies thousands of sorties a month. These losses also compare with some 5,000 helicopters lost in Vietnam, about two-fifths of which were combat losses.

“The cause of many of crashes in Iraq is uncertain, and statistics on losses seem to ignore helicopters forced down or that came under attack but did not crash. At worst, however, combat losses still seem to be less than half of the total number of helicopters lost, and overall loss rates in Iraq are not yet radically higher than in demanding peacetime training programs.”

Still, the attacks can't be dismissed, Cordesman says. Insurgents may be shifting towards a new strategy of trying to destroy helicopters in an effort to raise the political pressure on U.S. policymakers and operational pressure on the U.S. military.

The insurgents do, however, have good reason to find a new group of targets and helicopters are an attractive option. All of the insurgent groups are now fully aware that the US is increasingly vulnerable to attacks on its own forces, those of Iraq, and large, high-profile attacks on Iraqi civilians. The more media attention the insurgents can get through such attacks, the more likely it is that US domestic politics will increase pressure for withdrawal from Iraq or place limits on the use of US forces.

If the insurgents do “swarm” around helicopters as a target, they also can use virtually any automatic weapon, manportable surface-to-air missiles, and even RPGs. An ambush can simply consist of training insurgent troops to “swarm” their fire if a helicopter simply happens to fly by, or it can consist of a wide variety of planned efforts to prepare for an attack. In any case, the insurgent effort is limited and no new weapons are needed.

Helicopters are also highly desirable tactical targets. They are the key to rapid and relatively secure movement of forces and personnel. IEDs make the roads unsafe for small, isolated movements. Road movement takes time. Moreover, it takes large security forces to provide relatively security even force a well-organized convoy.

If the insurgents can limit helicopter use, or force a major addition in the US security effort, they gain in military as well as political terms. They have already forced the US into a vast military and contractor force protection and rear area security effort.

Beyond helicopter attacks, Cordesman also provides a number a scenarios Iraq's Sunni insurgents might use to exploit the weaknesses of the U.S. and Iraqi security forces.

For instance, he writes that the insurgents could:

--Disperse outside Baghdad and stretch US and Iraqi Forces: The total of US and Iraqi forces available in Baghdad will be very low relative to the area to be covered even when the build-up is completed. Keeping up enough pressure to tie these forces down in Baghdad, while dispersing to other areas where US and Iraqi forces are too thin on the ground to be effective.

So the helicopters could be the least of the U.S. military's problems.