Lugar: Iraq like farmer planting crop on floodplain

by Frank James

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.,) the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, indicated at the start of today's hearing at which Gen. David Petreaus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker are testifying that he believes all the attention on whether the Iraqi government and U.S. led military surge have met benchmarks was almost besides the point. His message was bleak.

One can debate, as many will do this week, whether progress in Iraq has been sufficient to justify continuing American sacrifices. But the greatest risk for U.S. policy is not that we are incapable of making progress, but that this progress may be largely beside the point given the divisions that now afflict Iraqi society.

The risk is that our efforts are comparable to a farmer expending his resources and efforts to plant a crop on a flood plain without factoring in the probability that the waters may rise. In my judgment, some type of success in Iraq is possible, but as policy makers, we should acknowledge that we are facing extraordinarily narrow margins for achieving our goals.

Here's Sen. Lugar's opening statement:

Dick Lugar U.S. Senator for Indiana

Opening Statement for the Hearing on the Petraeus/Crocker Report

U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Republican leader Dick Lugar made the following statement at today’s hearing on the Petraeus/Crocker report:

I join in welcoming General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to the Foreign Relations Committee. Their report is essential for Congress and the American people as we evaluate the complex circumstances and policy options that we face with respect to U.S. involvement in Iraq.

Our national debate has framed two interdependent steps of the current surge strategy. We are attempting first to reduce the violence in Iraq through the application of additional American troops, better training of Iraqi forces, and tactics aimed at sustaining stability in key neighborhoods. Second, we are hoping to use the “breathing space” created by improved security to induce Iraqi political leaders to conclude meaningful compromises on governance and power sharing.

At our last hearing on Iraq, featuring the GAO report on benchmarks, I expressed skepticism that the success or failure of the benchmarks will be determinative in Iraq. Benchmarks are an important starting point for debate, but they do not answer many questions, including the most fundamental question pertaining to Iraq: namely do Iraqis want to be Iraqis?

By this I mean are the Iraqi people, most of whom are now organized according to sectarian and tribal loyalties, willing to sacrifice their own pursuit of national or regional hegemony by granting their sectarian rivals political and economic power? Can a unified society be achieved despite the extreme sectarian fears and resentments incubated during the repressive reign of Saddam Hussein and intensified during the recent period of sectarian bloodletting?

Is there sufficient room for national reconciliation when many Sunnis continue to see their political preeminence as a birthright and most Shi’ites believe that their numerical superiority and the oppression they suffered under Saddam Hussein give them the right to dominate the new Iraq?

And even if polling indicates that many Iraqis do want to live in a unified Iraq, how does this theoretical bloc acquire the political power and courage needed to stare down militia leaders, sectarian strong men, and criminal gangs who routinely employ violence for their own tribal and personal ends?

I frame the question in these stark terms, because it underscores that achieving benchmarks -- which has been a very difficult process up to this point -- may be the least of the challenges ahead of us. Benchmarks measure only the official actions of Iraqi leaders and the current status of Iraq’s political and economic rebuilding effort.

They do not measure the degree to which Iraqis intend to pursue tribal or sectarian agendas over the long term, irrespective of decisions in Baghdad. They do not measure the impact of regional players, who may choose to support or subvert stability in Iraq. They also do not measure the degree to which progress is dependent on current American military operations, which cannot be sustained indefinitely.

Thus, the most uncertain step in the path to a unified, functioning Iraqi society is likely to be when benchmark successes would have to be preserved and translated into a sustainable national reconciliation among the Iraqi populace. That reconciliation would have to be resilient enough to withstand blood feuds, government corruption, brain drain, calculated terrorist acts, and external interference that will challenge social order.

One can debate, as many will do this week, whether progress in Iraq has been sufficient to justify continuing American sacrifices. But the greatest risk for U.S. policy is not that we are incapable of making progress, but that this progress may be largely beside the point given the divisions that now afflict Iraqi society.

The risk is that our efforts are comparable to a farmer expending his resources and efforts to plant a crop on a flood plain without factoring in the probability that the waters may rise. In my judgment, some type of success in Iraq is possible, but as policy makers, we should acknowledge that we are facing extraordinarily narrow margins for achieving our goals.

Our preoccupation with benchmarks is typical of our “one-step-at-a-time” perspective related to Iraq, in which the political horizon is limited to the next major event. Now, in mid-September 2007, we have arrived at the next milestone – the delivery of the Petraeus-Crocker report. The conventional wisdom is that the Administration will cite enough progress to challenge calls for withdrawal as lacking resolve, but not enough progress to alter the basic fault lines of the Iraq debate.

This debate over progress may be less illuminating than determining whether the Administration is finally defining a clear political-military strategy, planning for follow-up contingencies, and engaging in robust regional diplomacy. Each of these elements is essential if we are to expand our chances for success.

At this stage of the conflict, with our military strained by Iraq deployments and our global advantages being diminished by the weight of our burden in Iraq, it is not enough for the Administration to counsel patience until the next milestone or report. We need to see a strategy for how our troops and other resources in Iraq might be employed to fundamentally change the equation.

For example, are we going to attempt the sophisticated task of leveraging our new relationships with Sunni forces into a rough balance of power with the Shi-ites? Are we going to try to build bridges between our new friends in the Sunni community and Shi-ite elements? How will we maintain any enthusiasm among Shi-ite leaders for our goals if they perceive that we are strengthening Sunni rivals?

Even as the Administration defines its current strategy, it is vital that it plan for a range of post-September contingencies. The surge must not be an excuse for failing to prepare for the next phase of our involvement in Iraq, whether that is partial withdrawal, a gradual redeployment, or some other option. We saw in 2003, after the initial invasion of Iraq, the disastrous results of failing to plan adequately for contingencies.

Currently, because of the politically charged nature of the debate, military planning and diplomacy related to any “Plan B” are constrained by concerns that either would be perceived as evidence of a lack of confidence in the President’s surge strategy.

We need to lay the groundwork for sustainable alternatives, so that as the President and Congress move to a new plan, it can be implemented effectively and rapidly.

Finally, the pace and intensity of American regional diplomacy related to Iraq has failed to match the urgency and magnitude of the problem. Although Secretary Rice and her team have made some inroads with Gulf nations and other players, we still lack a forum with which to engage Iraq’s neighbors on a constant basis. We are allowing conditions in which miscalculation can thrive.

Every nation surrounding Iraq has intense interests in what is happening there. Yet the three Iraq Regional Working Groups established at Sharm el Shayk in early May have met only once since then. Broader regional conferences, such as the one that took place in Baghdad this past weekend, also have convened so infrequently that they have had little positive impact on Iraq’s status. An expanded ministerial meeting of Iraq’s neighbors is scheduled to occur in Istanbul next month. This is positive, but it is not a substitute for a continuous, visible forum in which we ensure the transparency of national interests and actions.

Bold and creative regional diplomacy is not just an accompaniment to our efforts in Iraq. It is a pre-condition for the success of any policy. We cannot sustain a successful policy in Iraq unless we repair alliances, recruit more international participation in Iraq, anticipate refugee flows, prevent regional aggression, generate new basing options, and otherwise prepare for future developments. If we have not made substantial diplomatic progress by the time a post-surge policy is implemented, our options will be severely constrained, and we will be guessing at a viable course in a rapidly evolving environment.

I thank the Chairman and look forward to our discussion.

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