by Frank James

The responsible exit strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan, according to many experts, is to train the militaries in both nations so they can provide internal security and protect their nation's borders.

Given that, the Iraqi army's relatively poor performance during the recent fighting against the Mahdi Army militia suggests very strongly that a lot more training is needed.

That's where the op-ed by Lt. Col. John Nagl in today's New York Times comes in.

Nagl who helped write the Army and Marines new counterinsurgency manual, calls for the U.S. military, policymakers -- including the president-- and, most importantly, the American people to take the U.S. military's training mission far more seriously if the goal is to Iraqify security in Iraq and eventually turn the fight over to Afghans.

According to Nagl, the military isn't fielding large enough advisor teams, which may be a function of the personnel strains in the U.S. military, though Nagl doesn't say that.

Another part of the military's problem is that it appears that troops who become advisors still do it at some sacrifice to their careers. It's definitely not a fast-track move in terms of a military career.

Doctrine — a standard enumeration of the purpose of a military organization and how it will accomplish its goals — is still nonexistent for the adviser mission. Organization is inconsistent, for example, with most Afghanistan teams consisting of 16 soldiers with no medic, while most Iraq teams contain 11 soldiers, including a medic. The fact is, both types of teams are too small for the tasks they have been assigned, and many consequently have been augmented on the ground by regular troops on an ad hoc basis.

This is simply because not enough advisers are being produced — just 5,000 per year. We are going to need ever more experienced, trained advisers as the size and complexity of the Iraqi and Afghan police forces and armies grow and as the combat burden increasingly shifts to them.

Part of the problem is institutional. The United States military’s ability in battle is unmatched, but we have a spotty history in terms of helping allies fight for themselves. Advisers who live and fight with a struggling “poor cousin” local army often do their dangerous and sometimes frustrating work out of sight of the brass, and it can be a career-killer for ambitious young officers.

You have to wonder if Nagl will be among the officers with a speed bump in his career path because of his public criticism of the military.

He also has this paragraph:

...United States military and civilian leadership must recognize that resources to support this major shift in strategy have to be re-routed from our regular forces. Left to themselves, the military services will inevitably neglect advisory efforts to sustain conventional forces. It took presidential direction to Vietnamize the war in Southeast Asia, and it will take a similar push to successfully “Iraqify” this war.

So he;s basically telling President Bush, and his successor presumably, as well as congressional leaders to get with the program, that it will take their leadership to get the military to properly staff the advisory mission.

Last, but not least, he addresses the American people, essentially telling them to man up:

Finally, the American people must continue to be patient. In the 20th century, the average counterinsurgency campaign took nine years. The campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are likely to run longer, and other commitments loom in this protracted struggle against Al Qaeda and its imitators. Bitter experience has long recognized that only local armies can ultimately prevail in counterinsurgency operations.

Nagl's views clearly align more with those of Sen. John McCain, who is all but officially the Republican nominee, than Sen. Barack Obama who leads Sen. Hillary Clinton in pledged delegates for the Democrat nomination.

McCain is open to leaving U.S. combat troops in Iraq until the Iraqis can take over. Obama, on the other hand, has said he would withdraw U.S. combat troops within 16 months of taking office. Advisors are clearly combat troops. Clinton, meanwhile, has called for withdrawing combat troops but is fuzzy on whether and when all combat troops would be out.

Nagl's op-ed, coming as it does only days before Gen. David Petraeus and Amb. Ryan Crocker provide Congress a status report, provides a lot of fodder for lawmakers and the presidential campaign.

He raises the big question. If the goal is to leave Iraqi and Afghan forces able to defend their respective nations, why isn't more being done now to accomplish that?